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Based on the valence model of expectancy theory and the Cornell model of job satisfaction, this 
field study investigated the relationship between reward contingency, unemployment, pay 
satisfaction, job satisfaction, and functional turnover. The latter of which separates turnover into 
four categories: poor performing leavers, good performing leavers, poor performing stayers, and 
good performing stayers. It was conducted with a geographically dispersed sample of sales 
representatives (i.e., from 25 states and 66 cities), resulting in unemployment rates that ranged 
from 2 percent to 12 percent. The sales representatives were employed by four companies that 
paid different combinations of salary and commissions, ranging from mostly salary and little 
commission to 100 percent commission. A discriminant analysis accounted for 62 percent of the 
variance in functional turnover and achieved an overall classification hit rate of 67 percent across 
the four functional turnover groups. Follow-up univariate analyses indicated that objective 
reward contingency (R[sup2] = 0.34), state unemployment (R[sup2] = 0.11), state sales 
unemployment (R[sup2] = 0.08), education (R[sup2] = 0.09), and tenure (R[sup2] = 0.08) 
accounted for most of the variance in functional turnover. Perceived reward contingency, pay 
satisfaction, job satisfaction, age, and gender were not related to functional turnover.  
Traditionally, it has been assumed that employee turnover was inherently bad, that frequent 
employee turnover was expensive, and that organizations should reduce turnover whenever 
possible (Brayfield & Crockett, 1955; Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson, & Capwell, 1957). Yet, it 
has also been argued that some kinds and levels of turnover are actually beneficial or 
"functional" for organizations (Abelson & Baysinger, 1984; Dalton, Krackhardt, & Porter, 1981; 
Dalton, Todor, & Krackhardt, 1982; Mobley, 1982; Muchinsky & Tuttle, 1979; Porter & Steers, 
1973). For example, Hollenbeck and Williams (1986,p. 609) estimated that simply replacing 
poor performing leavers with average performing new hires would increase the revenues of retail 
sales persons in their study by "roughly US$112,000 per person per year."  
While thousands of studies have investigated why employees choose to leave their jobs 
(Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982), very little research has directly examined the organizational 
consequences associated with voluntary employee turnover. In this article, I attempt to extend 
previous work in the area of functional turnover in a number of ways. First, I review and discuss 
the different kinds of measures that have been used to examine functional turnover. Second, I 
present a general model of functional turnover that is based on the valence model of expectancy 
theory and the Cornell model of job satisfaction. Finally, I present the results of an exploratory 
test of this model.  
MEANING AND MEASUREMENT OF FUNCTIONAL TURNOVER  
Dalton et al. (1981,1982) argued that the traditional stay/quit definition of employee turnover 
overstates the negative consequences of employee turnover and ignores its positive 
consequences. Accordingly, the "expanded taxonomy" turnover by Dalton et al. distinguished 
between two kinds of voluntary turnover, dysfunctional turnover, where someone valued by the 
organization leaves, and functional turnover, where a person not valued by the organization 
leaves.  
Only a handful of empirical studies have been published since Dalton and his colleagues 
formally distinguished between functional and dysfunctional turnover. However, these studies 
have operationalized functional turnover in somewhat different ways. These measures can be 
categorized according to the way in which "functionality" was measured 
(rehire/quality/replaceability, opportunity gains/losses, and functional turnover/retention) and the 
method by which the data were collected (subjective and retrospective vs. objective and 
prospective).  
Rehire? Quality? Replacement?  
In a purely descriptive study, Dalton et al. (1981) compared the traditional stay/quit turnover 
measure to their expanded turnover taxonomy. They determined whether voluntary turnover was 
functional or dysfunctional by having immediate supervisors retrospectively assess leavers' 
performance. Turnover was functional if the supervisor would not rehire the person who quit, or 
if the quality of their job performance was judged to be poor, or if it would be easy to replace the 
person who left.  
In another study which asked supervisors to retrospectively complete a nearly identical set of 
questions, Campion (1991) found that supervisors judged that work was done more efficiently 
when poor performers left and that they were more satisfied with the "exchange of employees" 
when turnover was functional rather than dysfunctional. Functional turnover was also negatively 
related to employee salaries, meaning that poorer employees who left (i.e., functional turnover) 
had smaller salaries than good performers who left (i.e., dysfunctional turnover).  
Opportunity Costs/Gains: Functionality and Flow  
Functional turnover has also been measured in terms of opportunity costs and opportunity gains. 
In its traditional economic usage, opportunity cost is the difference between what is earned on an 
investment and what could have been earned had the money been invested elsewhere. With 
respect to turnover, opportunity performance costs or gains represent the difference between 
what the organization "earned" the performance contributed by the employee with the 
organization--and what the organization "could have earned" through the performance of another 
employee.  
Two basic approaches have been used to measure the opportunity costs of turnover. One has 
been to compare the performance of each leaver with that of the average employee. Here, 
turnover is functional if the leaver has below average performance, but is dysfunctional if the 
leaver has above average performance. Campion (1991) used this approach when he asked 
immediate supervisors to retrospectively compare the productivity of former employees to that of 
average employees. The other approach to measuring opportunity costs has been to measure 
turnover flow, which compares the performance of leavers to the performance of their 
replacements (Boudreau & Berger, 1985; Campion, 1991). Positive turnover flow occurs when 
leavers are poorer performers than replacements, while negative turnover flow exists if leavers 
are better performers than replacements.  
While functional turnover, comparing leavers to the performance of stayers, and employee flows, 
comparing leavers to the performance of replacements, are clearly distinct concepts, the 
differences between them are most likely small in practice (Hollenbeck & Williams, 1986). In 
fact, Campion (1991) combined both kinds of comparisons, leavers to stayers, and leavers to 
replacements, into an overall measure of functional turnover which he labeled "productivity 
gain." Also the study of Campion (1991,p. 210) found that rehire/ quality/replacements and 
opportunity gains/losses "are similar measures."  
Functional Turnover and Functional Retention  
The concept of functional turnover has changed the way in which our field views employee 
turnover. Furthermore, classifying employee: separations as functional or dysfunctional helps 
companies more accurately assess the costs and consequences of turnover, Despite these 
advancements, functional turnover measures have one limitation: they focus only on the 
consequences of who leaves. Indeed, the samples used in Campion (1991) and Dalton et al. 
(1981) are composed only of leavers, not stayers. However, this is just one-half of the picture, for 
just as there are opportunity costs and gains associated with turnover, there are also opportunity 
costs and gains associated with retention. Organizations sometimes let the wrong people get 
away, but they sometimes encourage the wrong people to stay, too.  
Fig. 1, which has been adapted from Griffeth et al. (1990), illustrates the organizational 
consequences for turnover and retention.  
According to this framework, which has been used in several studies (Griffeth et al., 1990; 
Phillips et al., 1989; Williams, 1990a,b), organizations incur opportunity costs (i.e., 
dysfunctional consequences) when below average performers stay and above average performers 
leave. However, they reap opportunity gains (i.e., functional consequences) when above average 
performers stay and below average performers leave.  
Consequently, in this study, functional turnover is treated as a categorical variable consisting of 
good performing leavers, good performing stayers, poor performing leavers, and poor 
performing stayers. Several authors have used this approach when studying functional turnover 
(Griffeth et al., 1990; Phillips et al., 1989; Williams, 1990a,b). Abelson (1987) also used a 
similar technique when studying avoidable and unavoidable turnover. The advantage of this 
categorical measure is that it captures the opportunity gains and losses associated with retention 
and turnover while also permitting investigation of the different turnover antecedents associated 
with membership in each of those groups. Consequently, this categorical measure of functional 
turnover will be used in this study.  
GENERAL MODEL OF FUNCTIONAL TURNOVER  
Given that functional turnover is a combination of performance and voluntary turnover, 
Hollenbeck and Williams (1986) suggested that the ability of attitude-based interventions--or 
that of any other intervention--to influence functional turnover depends on (1) the relationship 
between attitudes and voluntary turnover, (2) the relationship between attitudes and performance, 
and (3) the relationship between voluntary turnover and performance. With respect to the first 
relationship, meta-analytic research confirms that voluntary turnover is negatively related to 
attitudes such as organizational commitment, work satisfaction, and overall satisfaction (Steel & 
Ovalle, 1984). Moreover, other meta-analytic research has shown that attitude-based 
interventions, such as job enrichment and realistic job previews, can reduce turnover (McEvoy & 
Cascio, 1985; Premack & Wanous, 1985).  
Given the well-established negative relationship between attitudes and voluntary turnover, 
functional turnover might result if attitudes were positively related to performance (relationship 
2). In this way, individuals with positive attitudes toward their jobs would be more likely to stay 
and would be better performers than those who left. Unfortunately, attitudes, such as 
organizational commitment and job satisfaction, which predict turnover, generally do not predict 
performance (Iaffaldano & Muchinsky, 1985; Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Mowday et al., 1982). So, 
while attitude-based interventions can reduce overall levels of turnover, it seems unlikely that 
they would result in a pattern of functional turnover where better performers stayed and poorer 
performers left.  
However, meta-analytic research (relationship 3) does show that performance is negatively 
related to voluntary turnover (Williams & Livingstone, 1993). More importantly, that research 
also indicated that the negative relationship between performance and voluntary turnover gets 
stronger (Mean r = -0,27) when rewards are contingent on performance and weaker (Mean r = -
0,18) when they are not (Williams & Livingstone, 1993). Thus, reward contingency appears to 
differentially affect the quit/stay decisions and behavior of poorer performers, who become more 
likely to leave, and better performers, who become more likely to stay. The valence model of 
expectancy theory, described below, suggests how reward contingency produces those results 
and how it might influence functional turnover.  
Expectancy Theory and Reward Contingency  
Expectancy theory predicts that, "a worker's satisfaction with a job or anticipated satisfaction 
with an occupation results from the instrumentality of the job for attaining other outcomes and 
the valence of those outcomes," (Mitchell, 1974, p. 1054). Therefore, if a job offers valued 
outcomes, and the attainment of those outcomes is contingent on remaining with an organization, 
then remaining with an organization is an attractive, satisfying choice. However, with functional 
turnover, the goal is to make the job much more satisfying for better performers than for poorer 
ones. Accordingly, attainment of valued outcomes should be contingent on individual 
performance rather on organizational membership.  
As shown in Fig. 2, an organization wanting to employ a retention-based strategy for influencing 
functional turnover would begin by making rewards contingent on performance (i.e., objective 
reward contingency). Workers should then perceive a positive relationship between rewards and 
performance after actual reward contingencies are established (Dachler & Mobley, 1973; Graen, 
1969; Kopelman, 1976; Kopelman & Thompson, 1976). Stated as a formal hypothesis:  
H1: Objective reward contingency will have a positive direct relationship with perceived reward 
contingency.  
In turn, if rewards are contingent on performance and workers perceive that this is so, then better 
performers should be more satisfied than poorer performers (Brayfield & Crockett, 1955; 
Cherrington, Reitz, & Scott, 1971; Iaffaldano & Muchinsky, 1985; Lawler & Porter, 1967; 
Podsakoff &Williams, 1986; Schwab & Cummings, 1970; Vroom, 1964).  
H2: The relationship between performance and satisfaction is moderated by perceived reward 
contingency such that performance and satisfaction will have a stronger positive relationship 
when perceptions of reward contingency are strong than when they are weak.  
If rewards are perceived as contingent on performance, and if poorer performers are less satisfied 
and better performers more Satisfied, then those differences in satisfaction should be related to a 
pattern of functional turnover where good performing stayers are the most satisfied, poor 
performing leavers are the least satisfied, and poor performing stayers and good performing 
leavers fall somewhere in between. In this way, differences in satisfaction should in turn be 
related to a pattern of functional turnover.  
H3: Rewards-based differences in job satisfaction and pay satisfaction will be related to a pattern 
of functional turnover.  
To date, there has not been a direct test of Hypothesis 3 under strong conditions of reward 
contingency. However, there is indirect evidence from several studies with very weak or 
nonexistent reward contingencies. In theory, those conditions should not produce the same 
pattern of satisfaction differences predicted under conditions of strong reward contingency. 
Indeed, Hollenbeck and Williams (1986) found that satisfaction facets, turnover intentions, and 
organizational commitment were unrelated to functional turnover for a sample of retail sales 
persons who were paid only one-half of 1 percent commission in addition to their salaries. 
Likewise, in a sample of hospital nurses, Phillips et al. (1989) found that high performing leavers 
(rather than low performing leavers) were most dissatisfied with promotion and growth 
opportunities, while low performing stayers were most satisfied (rather than high performing 
stayers). Finally, in another study with weak reward contingencies, Griffeth et al. (1990) found 
that low performing leavers were the least satisfied, but that good performing stayers (who 
should be the most satisfied when rewards are contingent on performance) had satisfaction levels 
similar to good performing leavers and poor performing stayers.  
In summary, the valence model of expectancy theory, along with empirical research, suggests 
that reward contingency should be related to functional turnover because it increases the 
satisfaction of better workers and decreases the satisfaction of poorer performers.  
Cornell Model of Job Satisfaction and Unemployment  
Predictions concerning the relationships between reward contingency, satisfaction, and 
functional turnover focus exclusively on influences within organizations. However, external 
forces such as labor market conditions are related to worker satisfaction and turnover (Schwab, 
1991), and may influence functional turnover as well.  
Based on the Cornell model of job satisfaction (Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969), Hulin, 
Roznowski, and Hachiya (1985) reasoned that employees adapt or change their level of job 
satisfaction depending on actual, not perceived, labor market conditions. In tight labor markets, 
where unemployment rates are high and there are few external job opportunities, workers will be 
more satisfied with their present jobs. However, when unemployment rates are low and many 
more jobs are available, workers should be less satisfied with their jobs. In support of this 
relationship, Hulin (1966) and Kendall (1963) found that communities with poor economic 
conditions (i.e., high unemployment rates, low percentage of owner owned housing, low median 
income per family) had higher levels of job satisfaction than communities with good economic 
conditions. It also follows from the Cornell model that unemployment rates should be directly 
and positively related to pay satisfaction. Employees who work in areas with high unemployment 
(i.e., few job alternatives) should have lower pay standards that should result in higher 
satisfaction because of smaller discrepancies between actual pay and desired pay. Stated as a 
formal hypothesis:  
H4: Unemployment will account for significant unique variance in both job satisfaction and pay 
satisfaction, and that relationship will be positive such that satisfaction levels are higher when 
unemployment is higher.  
Unemployment is also predicted to have a direct effect on functional turnover over and beyond 
the effects of all other variables. Both organizational and individual level analyses (Dreher & 
Dougherty, 1980; Eagly, 1965), indicate an inverse, direct relationship between unemployment 
levels and turnover. Further, Gerhart (1990) found that unemployment rates had significant direct 
effects on voluntary turnover over and beyond job satisfaction, perceived ease of movement, and 
intentions to stay.  
While high levels of unemployment reduce employee turnover, the research evidence is much 
less clear on what kind of effect unemployment should have on functional turnover. In other 
words, will high levels of unemployment encourage better or poorer performers to stay? 
Jackofsky (1984) argued that better performers should find it easier to obtain another job, but did 
not speculate about the influence of unemployment rates. Direct evidence on this issue is also 
somewhat mixed. The meta-analysis of Williams and Livingstone (1993) indicated that the 
negative relationship between performance and turnover did not vary with differences in 
national, industry, occupational, and city unemployment rates. These data suggest that 
unemployment would not affect the pattern of functional turnover. However, Williams and 
Livingstone (1993) did find significant differences for state unemployment rates that comprised 
two of the three unemployment measures in the present study. In all, because the research's 
evidence was mixed, I specified the following nondirectional hypothesis.  
H5: Unemployment will have a direct effect on functional turnover over and beyond the effects 
of all other variables.  
In summary, the valence model of expectancy theory and the Cornell model of job satisfaction 
suggest that performance contingent rewards and unemployment should be related to 
satisfaction, which in turn should be related to functional turnover.  
METHOD Study Design  
The "maxmincon" principle of Kerlinger (1973,pp. 307-313) guided study design decisions. 
Maxmincon refers to maximizing the systematic variance under study, controlling extraneous 
systematic variance, and minimizing error variance.  
Systematic variance in the two independent variables, reward contingency and unemployment, 
was maximized by obtaining participants who: (1) worked in jobs that differed significantly in 
reward contingency, and (2) who worked in separate labor markets which differed significantly 
in the availability of external jobs (Steel & Griffeth, 1989). The first criterion was met by 
sampling sales representatives from four companies (A, B, C, and D) which paid different 
combinations of salaries and bonuses.[sup1] The bonus and salary combinations were 7 percent 
and 93 percent for the sales representatives of Company A, 27 percent and 73 percent for the 
sales staff of Company B, 36 percent and 64 percent for the sales staff of Company C, and 0 
percent and 100 percent for the sales representatives of Company D who were paid straight 
commission. The second criterion was met since the sales representatives in each firm were 
geographically dispersed in independent sales and labor markets throughout 25 states and 66 
cities. Unemployment rates ranged from a high' of 12.4 percent to a low of 2.2 percent. With the 
exception of Gerhart (1990), who studied a national cohort of over 2,800 young adults, this level 
of variance in unemployment is rarely found in any one turnover study (Steel & Griffeth, 1989).  
Pre-existing differences between sales forces and companies were potential sources of 
extraneous systematic variance. Accordingly, a combination of homogenous sampling and 
statistical control was used to control these influences (Kerlinger, 1973). Although study 
participants were employed by four different companies, the sample was made as homogeneous 
as possible with respect to job requirements. In each company, sales representatives were located 
in their local markets close to customers and away from company and regional headquarters. 
Management control was outcome-based, and achieved through sales quotas. Except for sales 
managers, face-to-face contact with company management was infrequent. Two kinds. of 
statistical control were used to reduce extraneous systematic variance. First, individual difference 
variables such as age, gender, education, and tenure were measured and entered as covariates in 
all analyses. Secondly, three dummy-coded variables were created to capture any extraneous 
variance attributable to between company differences. Those organization dummy variables, 
along with the individual difference variables, were entered as covariates in the discriminant 
analysis of functional turnover.  
The last part in the maxmincon philosophy of Kerlinger (1973) is to minimize error variance. 
This was done by using standardized measures with established reliability and construct validity. 
In fact, the internal consistency reliability for all measures was 0.80 or higher. Another way in 
which error variance was minimized was to treat objective reward contingency (i.e.. 
commissions/salary + commissions) as an individual level variable, With four different levels of 
reward contingency, the standard procedure would be to create three dummy-coded variables to 
capture the variance. However, dummy variables were not appropriate because there was 
substantial variance in objective reward contingency within Companies A, B, and C (but not 
Company D that only paid 100% commissions). For example, within Company C, the average 
amount of total pay attributable to sales commissions averaged 59 percent, but ranged from 27 
percent to 91 percent, depending on individual sales performance. That is, the more pay received 
from commissions relative to total compensation, the greater the objective reward contingency. 
So in order to capture these differences, increase measurement accuracy, and reduce error 
variance, objective reward contingency was treated as an individual level variable in the analysis.  
Procedure and Sample  
Questionnaire packets containing cover letters from the researcher and the organization, a 
questionnaire, and a return envelope, stamped and addressed to the university, were distributed 
by company personnel departments. If a questionnaire was not returned, follow-up packets were 
sent directly to sales representatives after I month, and then again after 2 months. Approximately 
90 percent of the returned questionnaires were received within 6 weeks of the initial mailing. The 
questionnaire response rates for each company were 9 of 22 (41%) for Company A, 30 of 58 
(52%) for Company B, 21 of 42 (50%) for Company C, and 75 of 334 (22%) for Company D. 
The lower response rate in Company D was not unexpected since only one round of 
questionnaires was mailed to its sales representatives because of cost considerations.  
Because response rates were lower than expected, a multivariate analysis of variance was used to 
compare questionnaire responders to nonresponders on common data obtained from company 
records. This analysis indicated no significant differences between responders and nonresponders 
in turnover, tenure, performance, total compensation, reward contingency, or gender in 
companies A, B, and C. However, in Company D, follow-up univariate analyses indicated small 
differences between responders and nonresponders in tenure (13 vs. 11 months, p < 0.01), and in 
average total pay (US$2,364 vs. US$1,803, p < 0.01). Overall, these data indicated that response 
bias was small, and that the respondents were not meaningfully different from nonrespondents.  
Missing data reduced the final, usable sample from 135 to 98. A total of 45 participants, 8 from 
Company A, 20 from Company B, and 17 from Company C, were paid according to a salary plus 
commission system. The remaining 53 participants, all from Company D, were paid straight 
commission. Six percent of the final sample possessed a master's degree, 14.2 percent had some 
graduate school, 42.9 percent had graduated college, and 31.6 percent had some college, while 
the remaining 5.1 percent had graduated high school. The average age was 37, average tenure 
was 5 years, 89 percent were male, and 24 percent had quit after 1 year.  
Measures  
Objective Reward Contingency. Objective reward contingency was measured by determining the 
percentage of total pay derived from commissions for each sales representative. Average 
monthly commissions were divided by the sum of average monthly salary and average monthly 
commissions.  
Perceived Reward Contingency. The measure of instrumentality used here was developed by 
Ilgen, Nebeker, and Pritchard (1981) in an experimental work simulation designed to determine 
the reliability and validity of traditional and newly developed measures of expectancy theory 
constructs. Their results indicated that this within-person format had high test-retest reliability 
and strong validity. When modified for the sales representatives in this study, this item read:  
"Using the following scale, rate each item by placing a number between 0 and 100 on each line 
such that the lines in one row add to 100."  
If your sales performance for the year totalled US$, what would be your chances of earning an 
annual income of ...  
Participants indicated theft chances of receiving six levels of annual pay (starting with no pay to 
differentiate sales staffs on straight commission from those on salary plus commission, 
proceeding to five more levels of annual pay corresponding to average pay plus and minus2 SD) 
for each of six levels of annual sales performance (starting with no sales and proceeding to five 
levels of performance corresponding to average performance plus and minus2 SD). Responses 
were combined to form a six by six matrix with rows representing pay levels and columns 
representing performance levels. Values in the matrix were treated as frequencies in a bivariate 
distribution and a within-person correlation coefficient was calculated and then transformed to 
Fisher's z' scores to normalize the distribution (Ilgen, Pritchard, Dugoni, & Nebeker, 1980).  
Pay Satisfaction. Participants completed the pay satisfaction scale of the Job Descriptive Index 
(JDI) (Smith et al., 1969). Evidence of the JDI's reliability, and convergent and discriminant 
validity can be found in Johnson, Smith, and Tucker (1982). Responses were made using the 
conventional JDI format: "Y" for yes was coded 3, "N" for no was coded 0, and "?" for uncertain 
was coded 1 (Smith, Budzeika, Edwards, Johnson, & Bearse, 1986). Its internal consistency 
reliability was 0.81.  
Job Satisfaction. The four-item scale of Hoppock (1935) was used to measure overall job 
satisfaction. There were seven alternatives for each item (total scores ranged from 4 to 28) and 
participants were instructed to choose one of the seven responses in each item. Internal 
consistency reliabilities for this measure have been very good, ranging from 0.76 to 0.93 
(Hoppock, 1935; McNichols, Stahl, & Manley, 1978). Coefficient alpha for this scale was 0.80.  
Unemployment. State unemployment, state sales unemployment (i.e., for sales representatives, in 
general, within each state), and city unemployment figures were obtained from two US 
Department of Labor publications, the Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment, 
and Employment and Earnings. Unemployment figures were then assigned to participants based 
on the sales territories reported by each company.  
Performance. Because of the differences in raw sales performance measures across companies 
arising from different products and product prices, performance scores were standardized by 
month within each organization to facilitate comparison of individual sales performance across 
companies? Standardized monthly performance scores were then averaged to create two 
measures of individual performance.  
Past performance was an average of the 3 months of performance for each sales representative 
just prior to questionnaire administration. These data were used to conduct a predictive test of the 
moderating effect of perceived reward contingency on the relationship between performance and 
satisfaction. Overall performance was the average of standardized monthly, performance for all 
months before and after questionnaire administration (3 to 12 months after, depending on when 
and if the employee quit). Overall performance was used to compute functional turnover scores. 
Past performance and overall performance were positively correlated (r = 0.71).  
Functional Turnover. Four mutually exclusive groups were created by separating stayers and 
leavers (voluntary turnover data were gathered I year after questionnaire administration) into 
above and below average performers on the basis of overall performance within each company.  
RESULTS Hypothesis Testing  
Hypothesis 1. Table 1 shows the intercorrelations among study variables. As predicted, objective 
reward contingency was positively associated with perceived reward contingency (r = 0.56, p 
less than or equal to 0.05). Thus, there was a strong relationship between actual reward 
contingencies and perceptions of those contigencies.  
Hypotheses 2 and 4. Based on expectancy theory, Hypothesis 2 stated that employee 
performance and satisfaction would have a stronger positive relationship when perceptions of 
reward contingency are strong than when they are weak. Based on the Cornell model of job 
satisfaction, Hypothesis 4 stated that unemployment would account for significant unique 
variance in and be positively related to both job satisfaction and pay satisfaction. Hypotheses 2 
and 4 were tested with identical hierarchical moderated regression equations, one for pay 
satisfaction and the other for job satisfaction. Covariates (i.e., age, tenure, education, and 
gender), 'and main effects (i.e., past performance, perceived reward contingency, state 
unemployment, state sales unemployment, and city unemployment) were entered simultaneously 
in step i. The past performance X perceived reward contingency interaction term was entered at 
step 2.  
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. The past performance X perceived reward contingency 
interaction term accounted for significant additional variance beyond the main effects in step 1 
for the pay satisfaction equation (sr[sup2] = 0.042, p less than or equal to 0.03; full equation 
R[sup2] = 0.22, p less than or equal to 0.01), but not for the job satisfaction equation (sr[sup2] = 
0.0002, p less than or equal to 0.73; full equation R[sup2] = 0.09, p less than or equal to 0.53). 
The form of this interaction, derived from the full regression equation (Cohen & Cohen, 1983; 
Stone & Hollenbeck, 1989), was consistent with Hypothesis 2 because performance and pay 
satisfaction were positively related (r = 0.37, p less than or equal to 0.05) under conditions of 
higher perceived reward contingency than under conditions of lower perceived reward 
contingency (r = -0.01, n.s.).  
Hypothesis 4 was not supported. In contrast to the Cornell model of job satisfaction, none of the 
unemployment variables entered in step 1 accounted for significant variance in job satisfaction or 
pay satisfaction after controlling for the influence of the other variables. Moreover, even the 
zero-order correlations shown in Table 1, which provide a weaker test of hypothesis 4, indicated 
that state unemployment, state sales unemployment, and city unemployment were unrelated to 
job satisfaction, and negatively correlated with pay satisfaction. The Cornell model predicted that 
pay satisfaction and job satisfaction would be positively related to unemployment levels.  
Hypotheses 3 and 5: Discriminant and Classification Analysis. Hypotheses 3 and 5 dealt with 
functional turnover. Because functional turnover is a categorical variable with four unique 
groups, hierarchical multivariate discriminant analysis was used to test these hypotheses. The 
results of the discriminant analysis were corroborated by using linear classification function 
coefficients to assess the accuracy (i.e., hit rates) with which sales representatives could be 
correctly classified into each of the four functional turnover groups. Poor classification accuracy 
is indicated when, for example, poor performing leavers are incorrectly classified by the 
predictors as a poor performing stayer, a good performing leaver, or a good performing stayer. 
Finally, planned orthogonal mean contrasts between functional turnover groups were conducted.  
As shown in Table 2, the dummy-coded organization variables were entered as covariates in step 
I of the discriminant analysis to control for extraneous variance due to pre-existing between 
company differences. While there were significant differences (29%; multivariate R[sup2] = 1 - 
LAMBDA; LAMBDA is Wilk's LAMBDA) in functional turnover across organizations, the 
classification functions derived from the discriminant analysis in step 1 did not allow overall 
classification of the four functional turnover groups (35.71%,) at a rate significantly better than 
chance (33.28%).[sup3] Age education, gender, and tenure were entered as covariates in step 2 
of the analysis to control for pre-existing individual differences. Addition of the demographic 
variables in step 2 resulted in an additional 4 percent of explained variance (from A = 0.71 to A 
= 0.67). While overall classification accuracy was now significant (40.82%, p less than or equal 
to 0.06), the addition of demographic variables did not represent a significant increase in overall 
classification accuracy beyond that achieved with the dummy-coded organization variables in 
step 1 (35.71%).  
Hypothesis 3, which stated that rewards-based differences in job satisfaction and pay satisfaction 
would be related to a pattern of functional turnover, is a mediated hypothesis. In other words, 
objective reward contingency and perceived reward contingency produce a pattern of functional 
turnover through their effects on job satisfaction and pay satisfaction. Consequently, hypothesis 
3 was tested by entering job satisfaction and pay satisfaction (at step 3) before objective and 
perceived reward contingency (at step 4). Hypothesis 3 will be supported if job satisfaction and 
pay satisfaction account for significant incremental variance and classification accuracy in 
functional turnover, and if objective and perceived reward contingency do not.  
At step 3 of the analysis, inclusion of job satisfaction and pay satisfaction resulted in a 3 percent 
increase in variance explained (from A = 0.67 to LAMBDA = 0.64). However, that change was 
probably nonsignificant given that the canonical correlation, R[subc], which represents the 
degree to which the discriminant function is related to group differences, was unchanged from 
step 2. In fact, the small structure coefficients (s[subc]), which represent the correlation between 
each discriminating variable and the canonical variate (and are similar to factor loadings in factor 
analysis), suggest that job satisfaction (s[subc] = 0.11), and pay satisfaction (s[subc] = 0.02) 
probably do not contribute to differentiation between the functional turnover groups. However, 
overall classification accuracy did increase significantly over step 2, from 40.82 percent to 51.02 
percent.  
Table 3, which presents the separate hit rates for each group, shows that this was due to the 
improved classification of good performing stayers (60.87%). Yet that improvement must be 
viewed cautiously because classification of good performing stayers was not significantly better 
than that achieved with organization alone (54.35%) in step 1. Overall, these data suggest that 
there were probably not reliable differences in job and pay satisfaction across the functional 
turnover groups. Additional information on hypothesis 3 from univariate F tests and planned 
orthogonal contrasts will be presented below.  
Hypothesis 3 is also rejected because inclusion of objective and perceived reward contingency at 
step 4 of the analysis resulted in a large increase in explained variance (i.e., from LAMBDA = 
0.64 to LAMBDA = 0.44). If job satisfaction and pay satisfaction had acted as mediators, 
objective and perceived reward contingency would not have accounted for significant 
incremental variance. The large structure coefficient for objective reward contingency (s[subc] = 
0.77), indicated that most of the group separation at step 4 was attributable to objective reward 
contingency and not perceived reward contingency (s[subc] = 0.14). While the overall level of 
classification was significant (55.10%) at step 4, note that the addition of objective and perceived 
reward contingency did not produce a significant increase in overall classification accuracy 
beyond step 3 (51.02%). However, as shown in Table 3, the inclusion of reward contingency 
significantly improved the classification hit rate for poor performing stayers from 50 percent (14 
out of 28) in step 2 and 39.29 percent (11 out of 28) in step 3 to 64.29 percent (18 out of 24) at 
step 4.  
Step 5 of the analysis tested hypothesis 5, which predicted that unemployment would have a 
direct effect on functional turnover over and beyond the effects of all other variables. Tests of 
hypothesis 5 were generally supportive, but not conclusive. While inclusion of the 
unemployment variables at step 5 produced a 6 percent increase in variance explained (from 
LAMBDA = 0.44 to LAMBDA = 0.38), there was no change in the canonical correlation 
(R[subc] = 0.68), and only minimal change in the structure coefficients, with the latter indicating 
that objective reward contingency (s[subc] = 0.77), not unemployment (state unemployment, 
s[subc] = 0.15; state stales unemployment, s[subc] = 0.12; and city unemployment, s[subc] = 
0.06), was most strongly related to the canonical variate maximizing group separation. However, 
the classification analysis demonstrated that the addition of unemployment figures significantly 
increased the overall classification hit rate from 55.10 percent in step 4 to 67.35 percent in step 5. 
In particular, as shown in Table 3, inclusion of unemployment figures resulted in significant 
improvement in the classification of good performing leavers, from 21.43 percent in step 4 to 
64.29 percent in step 5, and good performing stayers, from 60.87 percent in step 4 to 71.74 
percent in step 5.  
Hypotheses 3 and 5: Univariate Analysis and Orthogonal Contrasts. Follow-up univariate 
analyses were conducted to further explore hypotheses 3 and 5. When univariate differences 
were found, orthogonal contrasts comparing each of the four functional turnover groups to each 
other were then examined.  
Hypothesis 3 predicted that when rewards were perceived as contingent on performance, poorer 
performers would be less satisfied and better performers would be more satisfied. Those 
differences, in turn, should be related to a pattern of functional turnover where good performing 
stayers are the most satisfied, poor performing leavers are the least satisfied, and poor 
performing stayers and good performing leavers fall somewhere in between. Consistent with the 
discriminant analysis, a follow-up univariate analysis indicated that there were no pay 
satisfaction (R[sup2] = 0.032, n.s.) and job satisfaction differences (R[sup2] = 0.01, n.s.) across 
the functional turnover groups. So hypothesis 3 is again rejected.  
Hypothesis 5 stated that unemployment would have a direct effect on functional turnover after 
controlling for the effects of other variables. However, due to the mixed research evidence, the 
hypothesis was exploratory and nondirectional. The univariate analysis and orthogonal contrasts 
for unemployment indicated that poor performing leavers faced higher rates of state 
unemployment (R[sup2] = 0.106, p less than or equal to 0.05) and state sales unemployment 
(R[sup2] = 0.077, p less than or equal to 0.05) than good performing leavers, poor performing 
stayers, and good performing leavers. That is, poor performers left despite significantly poorer 
prospects for alternative jobs. A similar pattern occurred for city unemployment, but those 
differences (R[sup2] = 0.042, n.s.) were nonsignificant.  
Additional Orthogonal Contrasts. Orthogonal contrasts also indicated that there were significant 
differences in education, tenure, and objective reward contingency across the functional turnover 
groups, but not age, gender, or perceived reward contingency.As in the discriminant analysis, the 
largest differences were in objective reward contingency. Orthogonal contrasts for objective 
reward contingency (R[sup2] = 0.343, p less than or equal to 0.05) indicated that poor and good 
performing leavers, respectively, received 100 percent and 91 percent of their pay from 
commissions. Those percentages were significantly larger than the percentage earned by good 
performing slayers (77%) who, in turn, earned a much larger percentage of commissions than 
poor performing stayers (39%).  
To better understand those effects, orthogonal contrasts were also conducted on the components 
of objective reward contingency, average total monthly pay, average monthly commissions, and 
average monthly salary. Not surprisingly, good performing stayers had the highest total pay 
(US$3,862), poor performing leavers had the lowest total pay (US$1,255), and good performing 
leavers (US$3,184) and poor performing stayers (US$3,057) fell in between. Also as expected, 
good performers earned significantly larger commissions than poorer performers. However, the 
most interesting results were found with salary differences. Ironically, poor performing slayers 
received larger salaries (US$1,990) than good performing slayers (US$1,108), who, in turn, 
received a larger salary than either good performing leavers (US$377) or poor performing 
leavers (US$0.00). While not an orthogonal contrast, another telling difference between the two 
groups of poor performers is that the average salary for poor performing stayers (US$1,990) was 
much larger than the average monthly commission (US$1,255) received by poor performing 
leavers.  
DISCUSSION  
The effects of reward contingency and unemployment on job satisfaction and pay satisfaction are 
discussed first, followed by an examination of their influence on functional turnover.  
Job Satisfaction and Pay Satisfaction  
Reward Contingency. Consistent with expectancy theory and past research, differences in 
objective reward contingency were strongly related to differences in perceived reward 
contingency. In turn, perceived reward contingency served as a moderator such that performance 
and pay satisfaction were positively related when perceptions of reward contingency were strong 
and unrelated when perceptions of reward contingency were weak. Yet, despite this moderated 
relationship, the significant differences in objective and perceived reward contingency across the 
four functional turnover groups were not accompanied by differences in job satisfaction and pay 
satisfaction. However, Griffeth et al. (1989), Hollenbeck and Williams (1986), and Phillips et al. 
(1989) also found limited differences in satisfaction across functional turnover groups, but in 
circumstances where reward contingencies were weak or nonexistent.  
One possible post hoc explanation for the absence of significant differences in satisfaction across 
functional turnover groups, especially pay satisfaction, is procedural justice (Greenberg, 1987; 
Thibaut & Walker, 1975). It may be that the presence of a commission system in each company, 
no matter how large or small, was enough to develop the belief that one's pay was justly earned, 
even if one's pay was low. This explanation was tested by conducting post hoc orthogonal 
contrasts between functional turnover groups on two items from the JDI pay satisfaction scale 
related to the issue of procedural justice. Some support was found for this hypothesis because 
there were no differences across functional turnover groups on either item, "Less than I deserve" 
(F = 1.07, p less than or equal to 0.37), and "Underpaid" (F = 0.44, p less than or equal to 0.72). 
This suggests that poor performing leavers, good performing leavers, and good performing 
stayers, all of whom received most of their pay from commissions, felt no differently about the 
fairness of their pay than did poor performing stayers, who received most of their pay from 
salary rather than commissions. Since this could account for the lack of sizable differences in job 
and pay satisfaction, future research should examine how procedural justice influences 
perceptions toward reward systems and functional turnover.  
Discrepancy theory provides another potential explanation for the lack of systematic differences 
in pay satisfaction across functional turnover groups. According to the discrepancy theory 
(Goodman, 1974; Heneman, 1985; Lawler, 1971; Locke, 1976; Rice, Phillips, & McFarlin, 
1990), employees compare the pay they receive to a pay standard. Consistent with the theory, 
Rice et al. (1990) found that people with higher pay standards were less satisfied than those with 
lower pay standards. If pay standards rise with individual performance, then conditions of strong 
reward contingency may simultaneously raise pay and pay standards for good performers. When 
this occurs, good performers should not be any more satisfied with their pay than poor 
performers. Thus, discrepancy theory would predict that it would be difficult to affect functional 
turnover through pay and pay satisfaction (Williams & Livingstone, 1993).  
Unemployment. Based on the Cornell model of job satisfaction (Smith et al., 1969), it was 
predicted that unemployment rates would be positively related to job satisfaction and pay 
satisfaction. This hypothesis was not supported because city, state, and state sales unemployment 
were unrelated to job satisfaction and negatively correlated with pay satisfaction. However, these 
results are similar to those found by Gerhart (1990). In his study of nearly 1,400 young adults, 
ages 19 to 23, unemployment was unrelated to job satisfaction.  
As a discrepancy theory, the Cornell model predicted that employees who work in areas with 
high unemployment (i.e., with few job alternatives) should have lower expectations or standards 
for their current jobs and job pay, and should therefore be more satisfied. That is, satisfaction 
increases as unemployment increases because the discrepancy between what employees have and 
what they want (i.e., what they could get elsewhere) gets smaller. However, the negative 
correlation between pay satisfaction and unemployment found in this study suggests a different 
process. That is, as unemployment drops and alternative employment becomes more plentiful, 
pay satisfaction increases. This is because the increased competition for a smaller pool of 
workers pushes wages up and entices workers to leave their current jobs for higher paying jobs. 
Pay satisfaction would increase because there is now a larger discrepancy between actual pay 
and pay standards, the latter of which is likely based on pay from one's previous job. Thus, 
according to this alternative explanation, it is actual pay rather than pay standards that changes.  
Functional Turnover  
Reward Contingency. More than any other variable, objective reward contingency exhibited the 
most discriminatory power across the functional turnover groups. In retrospect, this is not 
surprising since commission systems are designed to differentiate based on performance, and 
functional turnover is one part performance and one part turnover. However, objective reward 
contingency did more than distinguish good performers from poor performers. In fact, the largest 
differences in objective reward contingency occurred between poor performing stayers, who 
received only 39 percent of their pay from commissions, and poor performing leavers who 
received 100 percent of their pay from commissions. Ironically, that difference had nothing to do 
with commissions since poor performing stayers (US$1,067) and poor performing leavers 
(US$1,255) earned roughly equivalent commissions. The difference was due to monthly salary. 
Regardless of how well they performed, poor performing stayers received an average monthly 
salary of nearly US$2,000 per month. In comparison, poor performing leavers, whose pay was 
100 percent contingent on performance, received no monthly salary whatsoever.  
Overall, these results suggest that when pay contingencies are present they exert an influence on 
functional turnover by virtue of their effect on poor performers. Weak pay contingencies appear 
to encourage the retention of poor performers, whereas strong pay contingencies appear to 
encourage poor performers to leave. However, pay contingencies did not affect the turnover of 
poor performers through differences in job satisfaction or pay satisfaction. Instead, reward 
contingency seems to directly affect the retention or separation of poor performers.  
Finally, although these data seem to suggest that pay contingency does not influence the 
retention or separation of good performers, all that may properly be concluded is that pay 
contingency does not appear to influence the turnover of good performers when reward 
contingency is strong. Thus, these data do not indicate whether weak levels of reward 
contingency would encourage better performers to leave. This potential must be determined in 
future research.  
Unemployment. Support was found for the exploratory hypothesis that unemployment would 
have a direct effect on functional turnover. However, orthogonal contrasts across the functional 
turnover groups revealed a surprising result. Rather than leaving when unemployment was low 
and job opportunities were high, poor performing leavers left when unemployment was high and 
job opportunities were low. This anomaly is explained, however, by considering that poor 
performing leavers, all of whom were paid 100 percent commission, earned just US$1,255 a 
month, which was considerably smaller than the total pay received by good performers, or by 
poor performing stayers.  
Indeed, a post hoc investigation reveals that the monthly commissions earned by poor 
performing leavers were, on average, US$554 less than the average wage in their city and 
US$463 less than the average wage in their state (Employment and Earnings, US Department of 
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 1988). Thus, poor performing leavers probably left 
because of their poor performance and relatively low pay. In contrast, poor performing stayers 
remained with their organizations in spite of their poor performance and because of their 
relatively high pay.  
CONCLUSIONS  
These results, along with meta-analytic data (Williams & Livingstone, 1993) which indicate that 
reward contingency moderates the relationship between performance and voluntary turnover, 
Suggest that reward contingency can contribute to a positive pattern of functional turnover where 
poorer performers are more likely to leave. However, this study and others (Griffeth et al, 1990; 
Hollenbeck & Williams, 1986; Phillips et al., 1989) also indicate that satisfaction variables are 
not consistently good predictors of functional turnover.  
Unfortunately, there is much that is still not known about functional turnover. For example, do 
good and bad performers frame turnover decisions differently? When poor performers quit, is it 
primarily withdrawal from a negative situation? Or, conversely, when better performers quit, is it 
because they are attracted to a better job rather than withdrawing from their present job? Do 
better performers value different rewards than do poorer performers? How strong must reward 
contingency must be before functional turnover occurs? Will weak reward contingencies 
contribute to dysfunctional turnover and retention by encouraging good performers to leave and 
poorer performers to stay? Organizational efforts to influence and manage functional turnover 
are likely to be unsuccessful unless we address these basic questions.  
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NOTES  
[sup1]. Company A is a manufacturer and distributor of different kinds of filters and filtering 
processes, and sells these products in industrial, medical and environmental markets. Company B 
manufactures and sells office furniture products, ranging from chairs and smaller open office 
systems to fully integrated office systems. Company C manufactures, sells, and distributes 
conveyor equipment ranging from gravity rollers to overhead powered chain conveyors. 
Company D is a manufacturer and distributor of computerized automobile engine analyzers that 
are used to troubleshoot engine problems and/or evaluate engine exhaust emissions.  
[sup2]. Even though standardization makes performance measures comparable across 
companies, note that the performance comparison inherent in functional turnover is not across 
companies, but within companies. In other words, employees are categorized as good or poor 
performing stayers (or leavers) depending on whether their individual performance is above or 
below the average performance within their company. As such, standardization is not needed 
when functional turnover is treated as the categorical grouping variable in discriminant analysis 
(see Results). However, standardization was required to ensure the comparability of performance 
measures in the moderated regression analysis that was used to test Hypothesis 2.  
[sup3]. In all classification analyses, the Box M test for homogeneity of variance-covariance 
matrices was significant (McLaughlin, 1980). Accordingly, quadratic classification based on 
separate group covariance matrices was substituted for the default classification based on pooled 
covariance matrices, thus producing a conservative test which is biased in favor of the null 
hypothesis (McLaughlin, 1980).  
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C1    0.52      0.53      0.53      0.68      0.68 
C2    0.71      0.67      0.64      0.44      0.38 
C3   31.64**   36.34**   40.21**   74.31**   84.00** 
       C4 
 
C6 
C7   35.71%    40.82%    51.02%    55.10%    67.35% 
C8     0.51     1.58*     3.73**    4.59**    7.16** 
                 C5 
 
D1     -        1.05      3.16**    4.01**    6.54** 
D2     -        -         2.06**    2.88**    5.34** 
D3     -        -         -         0.81      3.23** 
D4     -        -         -         -         2.44** 
Note: Org A, Org B, and Org C = Dummy-coded variables 
for organization with organization D, 
100 percent commission, serving as the referent 
organization. Pay Sat = Pay satisfaction. Job 
Sat = Job satisfaction. Per Rew Co = Perceived 
reward contingency. Obj Rew Co = Objective 
reward contingency. State = State unemployment 
rate. State Sales = State sales unemployment 
rate. City = City unemployment rate. R[subc] 
= Canonical correlation. Z[subpc] = Proportional chance 
criterion indicating whether overall classification is 
significantly better than chance (Huberty, 
1984). Z[sub1] to Z[sub4] test the significance of 
the incremental overall classification accuracy compared 
to steps 1 to 4 of the analysis. 
*p < 0.06 
**p < 0.05 
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 A7    4.18**    3.16**       1.51*           2.71**    0.00 
 A8    3.37**    2.37**       6.09**          1.51*     1.51* 
Notes: PPL = Poor performing leavers. GPL = Good performing 
leavers. PPS = Poor performing stayers. GPS = Good 
performing stayers. Z[subpc] = 
Proportional chance criterion indicating whether group 
classification is significantly better than chance 
(Huberty, 1984). Z[sub1] to Z[sub4] test the significance 
of the incremental group classification accuracy compared 
to steps 1 to 4 of the analysis. n = Group sample size. e 
= The number of correct 
classifications expected in each group on the basis of chance 
alone. Step 1 = Dummy-coded organization variables. Step 2 = 
Step 1 + age, education, 
gender, and tenure. Step 3 = Step 2 + pay satisfaction and 
job satisfaction. Step 4 = Step 3 + objective reward contingency 
and perceived reward 
contingency. Step 5 = Step 4 + state unemployment, state sales 
unemployment, and city unemployment. 
*p less than or equal to .07 
**p less than or equal to .05 
[supa]Because classification accuracy was 0 percent for PPL and 
GPL in step 1, division by zero occurs when computing Z[sub1] 
for these groups. Therefore, 
the proportional chance criterion was substituted for Z[sub1]. 
[supb]Because classification accuracy was 100 percent for PPL 
in step 2, division by zero occurs when calculating Z[sub2] for 
this group. However, Z[sub2] is 
reported as n.s. because of the decrease in classification hit 
rate for PPL in subsequent steps of the analysis. 
DIAGRAM: Figure 1. Functional Turnover and Retention Note: This Figure has been Adapted 
from Griffeth, Phillips, Hom, and Steel (1990).  
DIAGRAM: Figure 2. Reward Contingency Model of Functional Turnover  
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